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Background: Assuring equitable universal access to essential health services without exposure to undue financial
hardship requires adequate resource mobilization, efficient use of resources, and attention to quality and
responsiveness of services. The way providers are paid is a critical part of this process because it can create
incentives and patterns of behaviour related to supply. The objective of this work was to describe provider
behaviour related to supply of health services to insured clients in Ghana and the influence of provider payment
methods on incentives and behaviour.
Methods: A mixed methods study involving grey and published literature reviews, as well as health management
information system and primary data collection and analysis was used. Primary data collection involved in-depth
interviews, observations of time spent obtaining service, prescription analysis, and exit interviews with clients.
Qualitative data was analysed manually to draw out themes, commonalities, and contrasts. Quantitative data was
analysed in Excel and Stata. Causal loop and cause tree diagrams were used to develop a qualitative explanatory
model of provider supply incentives and behaviour related to payment method in context.
Results: There are multiple provider payment methods in the Ghanaian health system. National Health Insurance
provider payment methods are the most recent additions. At the time of the study, the methods used nationwide
were the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings payment for services and an itemized and standardized fee schedule
for medicines. The influence of provider payment method on supply behaviour was sometimes intuitive and
sometimes counter intuitive. It appeared to be related to context and the interaction of the methods with context
and each other rather than linearly to any given method.
Conclusions: As countries work towards Universal Health Coverage, there is a need to holistically design,
implement, and manage provider payment methods reforms from systems rather than linear perspectives, since the
latter fail to recognize the effects of context and the between-methods and context interactions in producing net
effects.
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In 2005, the member states of the World Health Organi-
zation committed to Universal Health Coverage (UHC)
[1]. Specifically, their commitment was to develop their
health financing systems so that their citizens would
have universal access to essential health services (defined
in context) without having to suffer financial hardship in
paying for them. Subsequently, in 2012, the United
Nations General Assembly, in resolution A/67/L.36 of it
is 67th session [2], called upon member states “to value
the contribution of Universal Health Coverage to achiev-
ing all inter related Millennium Development Goals with
the ultimate outcome of health improvements…”. For the
purposes of this paper, we use UHC in our understand-
ing of the essence of the World Health Organization
definition of ensuring equitable universal access to a
core package of essential health services without expos-
ing people to undue financial hardship [3]. The details of
this ideal will have to be defined in context; in all con-
texts it requires adequate resource mobilization as well
as the equitable and efficient use of available resources.
A critical part of this effort will be provider payment
methods [4].
Provider payment methods refer to the mechanisms
used to transfer funds from the purchaser to the providers
of health services. These methods include line item and
global budgets, salaries, capitation with or without fund
holding for referral services, case-based payments, and fee
for service with or without a fee schedule. The provider
payment system, on the other hand, refers to the payment
method combined with all supporting systems such as
accountability mechanisms, management information sys-
tems, etc. Different provider payment methods create dif-
ferent provider behavioural incentives related to service
supply since they have different effects on the relationship
between provider income and costs for providing the ser-
vice, as well as the relationship between activities and
payment [4,5]. Apart from financial incentives, provider
supply behaviour can be influenced by other factors, such
as peer, professional, and client pressure, and factors in-
ternal to the provider such as value systems and ethics.
Also important to understanding incentives is that
provider payment methods are introduced and imple-
mented in health systems. Systems are made of separate
but interdependent parts that interact with each other.
Occurrences and outcomes within systems can only be
fully understood by appreciating the relationship and
interconnectedness between these parts [6-8]. Moreover,
health systems are complex adaptive systems (CAS), con-
stantly changing and governed by feedback. Intervening in
one part of the system will almost always have ripple
effects in other parts; they self-organize and adapt based
on experience. To fully understand incentives in a CAS, it
is important to apply a systems thinking perspective,studying the context in which the payment method has
been introduced and the resulting interactions.
The current study therefore set out to explore, from a
systems thinking perspective, the questions of: “What
kinds of provider behaviour are occurring related to sup-
ply of health services to insured clients in Ghana?; What
incentives might be driving the behaviour?; and What is
the influence of provider payment methods on the in-
centives and the behaviour?” Our focus was on financial
incentives for service supply behaviour related to the na-
tionwide National Health Insurance (NHIS) provider pay-
ment methods of the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings
(G-DRG) for services and itemized fees with a fee schedule
for medicines. A per capita payment for primary care,
which was an early pilot in one region at the time of the in-
vestigation, was not included in our research given the
focus on nationwide payment methods. The focus on fi-
nancial incentives was selected since behaviour motivated
by financial incentives (real or perceived) was and remains
a source of much debate, conflict, and concern within the
Ghana NHIS and links closely with concerns about cost es-
calation and cost containment.
Context: economic, socio-demographic, and health
After a long period of near stagnation, Ghana has seen
rapid growth in its GNI from an estimated US$ 320 per
capita in 2003, when the NHIS law was passed, to US$
1,410 (Atlas method current US$) in 2011 [9]. It is trad-
itionally an agricultural country with cocoa, timber, and
gold as its main exports. Oil was discovered off-shore in
2006 and production in commercial quantities started in
2011. The amounts produced are still small, but the im-
portance of oil to its economy is growing, and it has
played some role in the evolution of its GNI per capita.
The Consumer Price Index, which measures the per-
centage change over time in the general price level of
goods and services in a country, has risen each year and
has remained high over several decades. Annual averages
since 2003, when the NHIS was established, have ranged
between 10% to 27% [10,11] and the value of the cedi
has declined against the dollar.
About half of Ghana’s estimated population of 26 mil-
lion are below 15 years old. The majority of formal sec-
tor workers, with some exceptions, such as employees
of some tertiary educational institutions, belong to the
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)
pension scheme. Based on the 2011 SSNIT annual re-
port, 963,619 Ghanaians (about 4% of the total popula-
tion) were active contributors [12]. Even if the figures
are doubled to include formal sector workers who do
not contribute to the SSNIT pension scheme, it would
be reasonable to estimate that about 80% of Ghana’s
adult working population is employed in the non-formal
sector.
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very slowly, from 155 per 1,000 live births in 1983 to
1987, to 80 per 1,000 live births in 2003 to 2008 [13].
Maternal mortality declined from 503/100,000 in 2005
to 451/100,000 in 2008 [14]. Shortages of skilled human
resources have been and remain a problem. The World
Health Report 2006 estimated that Ghana had 0.15 physi-
cians and 0.92 nurses per 1,000 population. This com-
pared with 2.14 and 9.95 in a high-income country like
Canada and 0.77 and 4.08 in a sub-Saharan Africa middle-
income economy like South Africa [15]. The country’s
challenges, with inadequacies in infrastructure, equip-
ment, tools, and supplies in the health sector, mirrors
its human resource challenges. A little under 15% of the
public sector budget is allocated to health and the per
capita expenditure on health in 2013 was estimated at
US$35 [16].
The Ghana Health Service, the service delivery agency
of the Ministry of Health, employs most public sector
providers. Others are employed by other public sector
agencies with hospitals of their own, e.g., the Military,
Police, and the Universities. Private service delivery is
done by not-for-profit and self-financing (for-profit)
providers. Mission clinics and hospitals under the um-
brella of the Christian Health Association of Ghana
(CHAG) form most private not-for-profit providers.
The private self-financing sector is made of individual
physician, dentist, and midwife practices, hospitals, la-
boratories, and pharmacies.
The Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)
In September 2003, Ghana passed a national health insur-
ance (NHI) law (Act 650) to replace public sector user fees
introduced in the 1980s as part of structural adjustment
programs. Though the term UHC was not used, the gov-
ernment’s stated policy objectives in setting up a NHI
scheme show the principles of UHC. Both the original
[17] and revised [18] NHI policy frameworks state: “…the
vision of government in instituting a health insurance
scheme…. is to assure equitable and universal access for
all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality package of
essential healthcare… every resident of Ghana shall belong
to a health insurance scheme that adequately covers him
or her against the need to pay out of pocket at the point of
service use in order to obtain access…”.
The Ghana NHIS is described in several publications
[19-22]. The benefit package covers about 80% to 90% of
the most common clinical conditions in Ghana. The
NHI has a single payer arrangement through the NHI
fund. The NHI fund is about 70% to 75% from a value
added tax and 20% to 25% from formal sector SSNIT
contributions, 2.5% of which are mandated to be trans-
ferred into the NHI fund monthly. A small amount of
NHI financing comes from the annual premium, non-SSNIT contributors pay out of pocket and the registra-
tion fee paid by all subscribers.
Nationwide NHIS provider payment methods
Ghana’s NHIS started implementation in 2004, with
itemized billing with no standardized fee schedule for
services and medicines as the provider payment method
for public and private service providers. Each of the dis-
trict schemes negotiated with their providers itemized
fee rates for services, consumables, and medicines. In
the face of growing concerns over inefficiencies such as
random price variations for the same procedures and con-
sumables, cumbersome billing and claim vetting proce-
dures and cost escalation, the National Health Insurance
Authority (NHIA) introduced, in 2008, a case based pay-
ment system known as the G-DRG for services and proce-
dures, as well as standardized itemized fees for medicines
based on a medicine list. Apart from a few modifications,
this payment system has remained in use across Ghana in
its original design since then.
Classically, the two core components of a DRG pay-
ment system are a patient classification system and a
payment rate setting mechanism that takes into account
the intensity of resources used to treat patients in a
given DRG category to give cost weights or prices to the
DRG [23]. The G-DRG is not a pure DRG system in
that, although it has the patient classification system, it
does not have cost weights and severity levels. It was de-
signed, applied, and continues to be applied nationwide
for all levels of care from the lowest (Community Health
Planning and Services (CHPS) compounds) to the high-
est (teaching hospitals), to pay all accredited providers –
public, quasi-government, and private – for inpatient
and outpatient services. The tariffs reflect preceding
charges rather than a precise or economic costing; cap-
ital and equipment costs are not included. The tariffs are
classified into three broad groups of diagnoses, proce-
dures/operations, and investigations. The calculated dir-
ect cost of the services for consumables and labour are
uniform for related or similar diagnosis, procedures, and
investigations irrespective of level of care.
Indirect or overhead costs comprising labour, vehicle
maintenance and fuel, equipment and building mainten-
ance, housekeeping, utilities, and general administrative
and office expenses are calculated, increasing from the
lower to the higher level of care. The rationale is that facil-
ities at higher levels of care consume larger amounts of
overhead inputs because of their size and higher fragmen-
tation of services. The tariffs vary according to whether
the facility is government, mission, or private to take into
account the government subsidy, mainly for salaries but
also some infrastructure, equipment, and overhead costs
in the public and, to some extent, the private mission sec-
tor, as well as the zero subsidy in the private self-financing
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(inpatient or outpatient), type of intermediate service
(laboratory investigations, imaging investigations, theatre,
catering services), and specialty (obstetrics and gynaecol-
ogy, medicine, surgery, child health, eye, ENT, and dental).
Since some district hospitals have catering services and
others do not, inpatient tariffs differ by district hospitals
with catering services and those without [24].
The itemized fee schedule for medicines is based on a
NHI medicines list (NHIML) that is periodically revised.
Medicines can be dispensed by public and private pro-
vider facilities with an in house pharmacy/dispensary or
by private community practice pharmacies accredited by
the NHIA. Most community practice pharmacies, like
other private self-financing services, are based in wealth-
ier and peri-urban areas. Poorer rural communities rely
on chemical sellers (lay people licenced by the Pharmacy
Council to sell over the counter medicines). Some of
these are also accredited by the NHIA. In theory, there
is supposed to be a separation between prescribing and
dispensing; in practice, it is not enforced.
Payment to providers for services and medicines was
and remains retrospective. Providers file claims, which
go through a vetting process in the NHIA district scheme
offices or for the higher-level facilities such as teaching
and regional hospitals in the computerized central claims
processing office of the NHIA, before final payment. The
claims processes of many provider and district scheme of-
fices remain predominantly manual despite increasing
computerization. There remain administrative capacity,
human resource, technical, and other challenges that slow
down the process and can reduce the final value of the re-
imbursements [25].
The first review of the G-DRG tariffs after introduc-
tion in 2008 occurred when the Minister for Health, in
response to provider agitations, announced an interim
upward adjustment of G-DRG tariffs effective 1 July
2011. The increments were calculated based on an ana-
lysis of the trends in medical inflation since 2008, when
the G-DRG was first introduced. Inpatient tariffs were
increased by 30%, primary outpatient care by 22%, diag-
nostic services by 22%, and secondary and tertiary out-
patient care by 25%. In that same year (2011), the first
formal review of the G-DRG was commissioned by the
NHIA. Stallion & Milliman Consultants were engaged
for this review whose objectives were to: “simplify the fee
system, increase transparency and ensure that the G-
DRG developed were consistent with Ghana’s standards
of treatment” [26]. The review was completed in 2012
and resulted in a further upward adjustment in the rates
for all the G-DRG and some changes in the G-DRG
groupings with some removed or merged, or new ones
developed. The overall average change in the G-DRG
tariffs was about 26% above the rates that were set inJuly 2011. Implementation of the new tariffs started on
1st February 2013.
The first review of the NHIML and prices was in
October 2009, the second in March 2011, and the third
in July 2013. Data on the percentage increase in tariffs
for the first and second review could not be found.
However, for July 2013, the rise in tariffs was about 12%
above the preceding levels.
Many inputs into health service delivery in Ghana are
imported. Figure 1 shows the total value of NHIS reim-
bursements for medicines and services to providers over
time. In cedi terms, the amounts have risen steeply, in
dollar terms (exchange rates at 4.00 pm UT on 30th
June each year) the rise is slower and flattening.
Other provider payment methods
The health system had other provider payment methods
with which the G-DRG for services and itemized fee
schedule for medicines came to co-exist. The Govern-
ment of Ghana line item, global budgets, and salary pay-
ments provide supply side subsidies to public providers
from consolidated tax funds for service delivery, admin-
istration, infrastructure, equipment, tools, and supplies.
Some supply side subsides to public sector providers
also come from donor Sector Budget Support and pro-
gram funding. Allocation of Government of Ghana funds
to public sector facilities is often based on historical
budgets despite the theory that with the Medium Term
Expenditure Framework reform these budgets would to
be tied to Ministry, Department, and Agency vision, mis-
sion, objectives, and plans of action for the year. A major
reason for this would appear to be that the national
budget is so constrained it makes it difficult to relate al-
locations to requests. Fund flows also tend to be irregu-
lar and unpredictable in amount. CHAG facilities also
receive supply side subsidies since a large proportion of
staff salaries are paid from Government of Ghana Con-
solidated Funds. Most CHAG facilities are located in
underserved areas, considered as priority for service de-
livery, and are seen as supporting government to attain
its equity and access goals in service delivery.
Private self-financing (for-profit) providers receive no
government supply side subsidies. They rely for their in-
come on activity-based payments related to services and
population, namely out of pocket payments by clients,
direct reimbursements by some corporations, and, since
2004, NHIS reimbursements. Sometimes these providers
chose not to participate in the NHIS because they con-
sider the tariffs inadequate. Before the introduction of the
NHI scheme clients in public and private sectors paid out
of pocket fees based on itemized fees with no fee schedule.
Non-insured clients continue to pay these fees in both
sectors. Some public sector providers earn extra income
through part time locums in private facilities. In some
Figure 1 Total value of all NHIS claims (medicines, services, inpatient, and outpatient) reimbursed.
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ports of under the table charges by some public sector
providers also exist but it is hard to document the extent
of the practice.
Implementation of a pilot per capita payment method
for primary outpatient care has been on-going in theFigure 2 Payment and service provision inter-relationships.Ashanti region of Ghana, which has 19% of the popula-
tion, since January 2012. Plans to scale up per capita pay-
ment for primary care nationwide have been announced.
Figure 2 summarizes the purchasers and providers in the
Ghana health system, method(s) used by each purchaser,
and fund flow from purchaser to provider.
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There are several theories of provider behaviour that
predict incentives and supply responses to payment
methods. Building on literature reviews [4,5] of provider
payment methods and the financial incentives for supply
behaviour they potentially generate we theorized that
supply can be modified in two broad dimensions. One
dimension is related to the numbers of client encounters
a provider has in a given time period. This dimension
can change by an increase or decrease in the individual
numbers of clients making up the provider’s client pool,
or in numbers of visits per client for the same pool, or a
combination of the two. Question in relation to this
dimension would be whether there are incentives for
providers to try to increase or reduce numbers of en-
counters. A variety of means, such as modifying opening
and closing hours, referring or not referring clients to
other providers, making the service more or less attract-
ive to clients, etc., could be employed by providers to
affect this dimension. Incentives to have more client
encounters would not be infinite but bounded by the
provider infrastructure, equipment, tools, supplies, and
human resources, as well as the perceived and actualA
B
Figure 3 (A) Dimensions of supply. (B) Theorized map of provider paymvalue of the alternative uses of provider’s time and
resources.
The second dimension of supply would be related to
the inputs into the services provided in each client en-
counter regardless of the number of encounters. The
manifestation of this dimension would be related to
incentives to supply more or less medicines, laboratory
tests, procedures, etc. Again, the incentive to supply
more or less would be bounded rather than infinite.
These two dimensions could be simply summarized in
the form of a graph as in Figure 3A. The theorized ex-
pected incentives in these two dimensions for each of
the provider payment methods operational in Ghana,
based on the review of the literature, without analysing
the effect of context and interactions with other pro-
vider payment methods in the system, can be mapped
onto this graph as in Figure 3B.
Since our objective was to understand service supply
behaviour and incentives related to the NHIS provider
payment methods in the context of Ghana and its health
system, we went beyond the simple linear theoretical
model of Figure 3A,B and drew on realistic evaluation
[27] and systems thinking theories including the conceptent in Ghana onto dimensions of supply incentives.
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have already described features of CAS and the rele-
vance to this study in our introduction.
Realistic evaluation theory suggests that a particular
action(s) leads to outcome(s) or effect(s) by triggering a
mechanism or set of mechanisms acting in context. The
link between action and outcome is thus complex and
non-linear. Thus, the observed effects of provider pay-
ment methods in the Ghanaian health system may not
manifest as direct linear causative effects between the
payment method and the observed service supply behav-
iour as theorized in Figure 3B. Rather, any given pro-
vider payment method will interact with the context and
other methods to trigger mechanisms that would lead to
observed service supply behaviours and incentives. They
could, but would not necessarily be, as predicted from
the theoretical linear analysis in Figure 3B.
Methods
The study was carried out over a 6-month period from
March to August 2013 using mixed methods of data col-
lection. Google and PubMed searches for “provider pay-
ment methods in Ghana”, “provider payment systems in
Ghana”, “Ghana DRG payment system”, and “Ghana Na-
tional Health Insurance Scheme” were used to identify
grey and published literature for review. The Ministry of
Health, Ghana Health Service, and NHIA websites were
searched for reports with relevant information. Addition-
ally, key informants were asked whether there were any
reports, administrative memo, and other material in their
records and archives related to provider payment methods
that could be made available for review. The search was
focused on the period January 2003 to August 2013. Rou-
tine management information system data of providers
and schemes related to utilization and claims over the
same period was obtained for secondary analysis. Some of
the national level provider data could not be obtained for
the period 2005 to 2007.
Primary data collection at the regional and district level
was conducted between April and June 2013. Follow-on
interviews and two validation meetings with respondents
to discuss our initial analysis and conclusions were con-
ducted in July/August 2013. Table 1 summarizes the geo-
graphic location of primary data collection, methods of
data collection, and number of respondents for each
method employed. The study had several questions be-
yond the ones presented in this paper. We only describe
variables and indicators from which data was drawn to an-
swer the questions of this paper.
The national level key informant interview guide items
explored how the G-DRG and itemized fee schedule for
medicines payment methods were designed and imple-
mented, and perceptions of service supply incentives
and behaviour related to the design and implementation.At the district level, key informant interviews were held
with District Insurance Scheme office managers, District
Health Directorate staff, and health facility managers.
Areas covered in the interviews were observations and
perceptions of how the NHIS provider payment system
had affected health facility and insurance scheme office
decisions related to service supply and the advantages
and disadvantages of the methods.
Within health facilities, observations of time spent by
clients at different service points and in total, prescrip-
tion content analysis, and client exit interviews were car-
ried out using observation checklists, interview guides,
and semi-structured questionnaires. The client exit in-
terviews had a mix of closed and open ended items to
explore client experience in the clinic related to service
supply and responsiveness, previous experiences, opin-
ions about the NHIS, and suggestions for making the
NHIS more responsive.
Sampling
Sampling was purposive. Participants for the national level
key informant in-depth interviews were selected from the
list of designers of the G-DRG payment method [28]. For
regional and district primary data collection, we stratified
the country into three zones of relatively similar socio-
economic characteristics, namely Northern (Upper East,
Upper West, and Northern regions); Central (Brong Ahafo
and Ashanti regions), and Southern (Volta, Eastern, Greater
Accra, Central, and Western regions). Within the Central
zone the Brong Ahafo region was purposively selected be-
cause the on-going pilot of capitation in the Ashanti region
would make it difficult to evaluate incentives inherent in
the nationwide payment systems as against capitation pilot
effects. Within the Southern ecological zone, the Greater
Accra region was purposively selected because of its peculi-
arity of being 90% urban with a large and active private
self-financing provider community and the lowest average
poverty levels in the country. Within the three Northern re-
gions, which have the highest percentage of rural popula-
tions and poverty levels in the country, the Upper West
Region was randomly selected by balloting since there was
no clear rationale to justify purposive selection.
Within each of the three regions, a list of the most
recent local government demarcation and classification
of districts with districts stratified into rural, municipal,
and metropolitan was obtained. One district in each cat-
egory was selected per region by balloting. Greater Accra
was the only region with metropolitan districts and a
sub-metropolis in Accra was selected by balloting. The
NHIA office covering each selected district was included
in the sample.
In the selected districts, a list of government, CHAG,
and private self-financing facilities was obtained from the
Ghana Health Service and one NHIA accredited district
Table 1 Geographic location of primary data collection (level, facility type, and ownership), method of data collection,

















National Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 14 0 0 0
Ashiedu Keteke
sub-metro
Ussher polyclinic Polyclinic Public (GHS) 2 35 35 35
PML Children’s hospital Hospital Public (GHS) 0 33 34 34
Cathedral clinic Clinic Private (PSF) 0 35 25 25
Ashiedu Ketete district
scheme
Purchaser Public (NHIA) 1 0 0 0
La Dadekotopon
sub-metro
La General hospital Hospital Public (GHS) 2 35 37 37
Madina La Nkwantang
municipality
Pentecost hospital Hospital Private (CHAG) 2 35 34 34
North Legon hospital Hospital Private (PSF) 2 31 22 22
Madina Polyclinic
(New Road)
Polyclinic Public (GHS) 2 35 35 35
Ga municipal scheme Purchaser Public (NHIA) 1 0 0 0
Ada East District Ada HC Health centre Public (GHS) 2 35 35 35
Pute CHPS CHPS Public (GHS) 2 5 4 4
TOTAL Greater Accra
Region
30 279 261 261
Dorma municipality Amasu HC Health centre Public (GHS) 2 10 11 11
Twumkrom CHPS CHPS Public (GHS) 2 0 0
Dorma Presby Hospital Hospital Private (CHAG) 2 30 23 23
Saviour clinic Clinic Private (PSF) 1 13 13 15
Dormaa district scheme Purchaser Public (NHIA) 1
Dorma West district Nkrankwantakrom Health centre/DH Public (GHS) 2 29 39 39
Kojo Kumi Krom Health centre Private (CHAG) 29
Yaa Krom HC Health centre Private (CHAG) 2 16 2 2
Kwakuanya Ebenezer
Methodist
Clinic Private (CHAG) 1 0 0
Kyremesu Presby HC Health centre Private (CHAG) 2 3 18 18
Kwabenadwomo Health centre Public (GHS) 2 13 0
TOTAL Brong Ahafo
Region
17 143 106 108
Sisala East district Tumu hospital Hospital Public (GHS) 2 35 37 37
Wellembele HC Health centre Public (GHS) 2 16 19 19
Nnamdouonu CHPS CHPS Public (GHS) 2 7 8 8
Mama Mary Clinic Private (PSF) 2 18 22 22
Sissala East district scheme Purchaser Public (NHIA) 1 0 0 0
Wa municipality Kambali HC Health centre Public (GHS) 2 30 37 37
Tampalipani CHPS CHPS Public (GHS) 2 4 4 4
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Table 1 Geographic location of primary data collection (level, facility type, and ownership), method of data collection,
and numbers of respondents (Continued)
Islamic hospital Hospital Private (PSF) 2 35 26 32
Wa Municipal scheme Purchaser Public (NHIA) 1 0 0 0
TOTAL Upper West
Region
16 145 153 159
GRAND TOTAL 63 567 520 528
GHS, Ghana Health Service; PSF, Private Self-Financing; CHAG, Christian Health Association of Ghana; CHPSC, Community Health Planning and Services Compound;
NHIA, National Health Insurance Authority.
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sector were selected by balloting. Where the district had
CHAG and private self-financing facilities, one CHAG
and one private facility were selected by balloting if there
was more than one; if there was only one it was selected.
During data collection, some selected facilities had to be
substituted with the nearest facility of the same category
because the information in the national level facility list-
ings did not always reflect what was happening at the
frontline and the selected facility was no longer functional.
Data collectors visited each clinic starting at the morn-
ing shift hours of 8.00 am. All clients entering the clinic –
regardless of insurance status – were tracked for time
spent at the different service points until a maximum of
35 clients was reached. Some of the smaller clinics had
low client loads and it was not possible to get 35 clients in
one day but the time frame and budget of the study did
not allow repeat visits. Prescriptions issued to these cli-
ents were copied for analysis, and an exit interview
administered. Ethical clearance was obtained from the
Ghana Health Service Research and Development div-
ision; all tracking and interviewing was done with in-
formed consent.
Data analysis
The study was carried out in response to a request by
the Ghana NHIA for an evaluation of its DRG payment
methods. The constraints of the time frame of the re-
quest meant that the data collection and analysis was
done using overlapping processes. The team had mixed
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis
skills among the members. The same two members of
the research team did all the national level in-depth in-
terviews and, together with a third team member, they
performed the qualitative analysis. For the district level
primary data collection, the research team split into
three groups to collect data with support from research
assistants.
Apart from notes during the interview, in-depth inter-
views were recorded and transcribed. Analysis was man-
ual to identify themes, commonalities, and contrasts.
The open-ended questions in the exit interviews were
typed into Excel, coded, and classified by themes and
sorted for analysis. Primary quantitative data analysiswas done in Excel and Stata. Routine health manage-
ment information system data was analysed in Excel. We
used frequencies, cross tables, and trend lines for the
quantitative data analysis. Team members were assigned
responsibility for analysing particular data sets depend-
ing on their expertise.
To help generate a more holistic theory as to the rela-
tionships between provider payment methods, service
supply incentives and behaviour, and what mechanisms
explain these observed effects, we used causal loop and
causes tree diagrams [29] – both systems thinking tools.Validity, quality assurance, and limitations
Several methods were used to ensure validity. Firstly, we
have presented our methods in detail to enable readers to
judge the quality of the data. Secondly, the whole team
discussed analysis and conclusions from each data set, and
findings from different data sets related to the same ques-
tion were compared as part of triangulation and minimiz-
ing individual team member biases. This also allowed a
more reflexive approach to data analysis. Thirdly, we paid
attention to extreme as well as middle cases in our ana-
lysis and did not focus on frequently repeated responses
only. Fourthly, before finalizing our report, we organized
two different half-day validation meetings with representa-
tives of our respondents to present our initial analysis and
conclusions and obtain their feedback. This was part of
the iterative process of data collection and data analysis.
We also made our draft report available to respondents
who were willing to read it, to check if it was valid from
the perspective of their experiences that we were trying to
describe and analyse.Findings and discussion
We used trends in utilization for insured and uninsured
to assess changes in supply related to the number of
clients seen by providers. The data is summarized graphic-
ally in Figures 4, 5, and 6. Both the provider and purchaser
data sets tell the same story of increased numbers of visits
per active insured member for inpatient and outpatient
services. There does not appear to have been a similar
change over time in the number of visits to formal pro-
viders for the uninsured. Data was not available to enable
Figure 4 Outpatient (OP) and inpatient (IP) claims per active
member per annum (NHIA routine management information
system data).
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formal providers.
The insurance status of the clients participating in our
exit interviews showed the same pattern of a dominance
of utilization of formal services by the insured. Of the
total of 567 clients in the exit interviews, 432 (76%) had
a valid insurance ID card.
It is, however, difficult to come to any firm conclusion
from the data available that this utilization reflects in-
centives for providers to preferentially see insured clients
or is due to service provider (supplier)-induced demand.
There are several possible reasons related to demand as
well as supply that could explain the data. These include
the increases in utilization among the insured reflecting
increased client demand induced by the removal of the
financial barrier and frivolous use by insured clients also
related to the removal of the financial barrier. It could,
however, also reflect some supplier-induced demand. Sev-
eral respondents in our national level qualitative inter-
views mentioned that, for any given illness episode, the
G-DRG design allows a provider to bill for three visits for
outpatient care – the initial visit and two follow-up visits.Figure 5 Provider routine management information system data trenIt could be to the financial advantage of the provider to
bill routinely for all three visits regardless of whether the
client needed or even made them.
Making it even more difficult to conclude on supplier-
induced demand as a major reason for the increased
numbers of encounters per insured client is that our key
informant interviews with frontline providers suggested
that the G-DRG is leading to some shifting of cases in
the form of referral. The quote below illustrates this as
well as the impression we got that there was a disincen-
tive to see certain kinds of insured clients because pro-
viders felt the reimbursements were inadequate for the
inputs needed to manage the case.
“…you can imagine somebody bringing an ulcer… you
know that (dressing) a big sore daily… the cost will go
up so you will lose… so we were losing, so that was
why most of us were not dressing this thing, we refer
them to the hospital… yes, even the suturing too was a
problem; the money was just a token.” Rural Health
Centre nurse
The actual as well as perceived inadequacy of the re-
imbursement rates were compounded by the delays in
reimbursements. To illustrate with the words of a hos-
pital medical superintendent:
“…The payment system has really broken down to a
certain extent. They are not consistent with the
payments and it is disturbing our work. It makes us
financially not sound… Promptness is the bigger
problem rather than the rate… If they would pay us
promptly I would be so happy.”
These observations lead to other findings on the di-
mension of supply related to input use per client. The
indicators explored to help understand this dimension
of provider supply decisions were volume of tests andds in outpatient (OP) visits for insured and uninsured.
Figure 6 Provider routine management information system
data trends in inpatient (IP) visits insured and uninsured.
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in facilities.
Volume of diagnostic tests and procedures
Some of the responses obtained from providers and cli-
ents suggest that the bundled payments of the G-DRG
for services were a disincentive to carry out extensive
diagnostic investigations whether they were needed or
not, for example:
“…the grouped billing… is a disincentive to carry
extensive investigations” Pharmacist, Urban Polyclinic
An NHIS subscriber described how he presented for
services without showing his insurance card. After his
history and examination, he was asked to do several la-
boratory tests to help confirm a diagnosis. At this point,
he mentioned he had an insurance card and asked if that
could cover his treatment including the laboratory tests.
There was a subtle change in the facial expression of the
staff and he was asked why he had not provided thisFigure 7 Provider medicine supply behaviour (prescribing and dispeninformation earlier. He was then asked to please give his
folder back for review and wait. After a while, the folder
was brought back to him with the laboratory tests can-
celled, and the information that they were not needed.
He could just go and collect his medicines.
Medicine prescribing
The literature review of the incentives associated with
different payment methods suggests that over or at least
adequate provision would be an incentive for the supply
of medicines under the NHIS, given that an itemized fee
for medicine schedule is the payment method. Our data
sometimes suggested, but was not always convincingly
in support of, a situation of adequate or over rather than
under provision of medicines. The average number of
medicines per outpatient prescription in our sample was
four for all prescriptions (n = 527)a, three for the non-
insured (n = 98), and four for the insured (n = 429). The
most recent national data on prescribing indicators avail-
able for comparison was the pharmaceutical situation
assessment carried out in May/June 2008 [30]. It unfortu-
nately did not compare data between insured and unin-
sured. The average number of medicines per prescription
in this survey was four.
Other prescribing indicators from our survey are sum-
marized in Figure 7 and compared with data from the
2008 national survey. There was no data on whether
medicines were on the NHIML in the 2008 survey. It
would be expected that facilities would supply nearly
100% of the medicines prescribed from their dispensaries
since, in theory, the more medicines supplied, the more
income the provider earns. In our survey, however, only
78.7% of medicines prescribed were dispensed in the fa-
cility. A higher percentage was dispensed in the facility
to the insured (81.6%) as compared to the uninsuredsing).
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2008 national survey data where 94.2% of all medicines
prescribed were dispensed in the facility, the percentage
of medicines prescribed that were dispensed in the facil-
ity, whether to insured or uninsured, is low. It raises
questions as to whether something other than insurance
status and provider payment method is modifying pre-
scribing and dispensing behaviour.
The NHIS policy requires that medicines are pre-
scribed by generic name and are on the NHIML, other-
wise they do not qualify to be supplied “free” under the
NHIS. As Figure 7 shows, there was higher prescribing
of medicines by generic name and from the NHIML for
insured as compared to uninsured clients. It is reason-
able to suspect that this is an influence of the provider
payment method and its associated rules. However, in
spite of these rules, not all medicines for insured clients
were prescribed by generic name or listed on the NHIML.
It would appear that something else is also influencing be-
haviour. The influence is probably bigger for the unin-
sured who do not have the effect produced by the rules of
the NHI provider payment method. Our data does not
allow a complete explanation of what is causing these pre-
scribing and dispensing behaviour gaps, which are wider
for the uninsured than the insured. We can only make
some guesses based on our observations. One of them is
that providers repeatedly complained that the reimburse-
ment rates for some medicines on the NHIML are too
low. Perhaps, the actuality as well as the perception of too
low tariffs could negate, in part, any incentives to pre-
scribe and dispense such medicines. Secondly, weaknesses
in the implementation of the rational use of medicines
policy in Ghana could also explain the uninsured data.
The rational use of medicines policy requires that all med-
icines are prescribed by generic name and are listed on
the Essential Medicines List. The Essential Medicines List
and the NHIML overlap, but not completely. Finally, the
condition of some patients may just have required medi-
cines to be prescribed outside the NHIML and the Essen-
tial Medicines List, and which were not available as
generic. It is doubtful, however, if such cases at the out-
patient primary care level should account for as many as
10 to 25% of prescriptions.
The exit interview data confirmed the failure to supply
all medicines prescribed in the facility dispensary and
also showed insured client discontent with this failure.
Of the 41 clients in the exit interviews (7% of the total
sample) who felt the NHIS was bad, a little over half
(22) gave a reason related to the failure to supply all
medicines prescribed free as part of their NHIS benefits.
Examples typical of these responses include:
“The aspect where the scheme does not cover all the
drugs is worrying to us especially we the poor…”“They do not give all the drugs”“Buying drugs outside the hospital while you still have
a valid insurance”“…dislike the NHIS because initially it was supposed
to be free but now I’m made to buy drugs anytime”
Some out of pocket payments by insured clients is not
a new finding; as many as 94% of respondents in the
Ghana Demographic and Health Survey [13] reported
sometimes making out of pocket payments for medi-
cines, services, or both. The SHINE project also docu-
mented insured client out of pocket payments. They
were, however, significantly lower than uninsured client
payments [31,32]. Some of these out of pocket payments
are for services and medicines not covered by the NHIS.
Others are related to managerial inefficiencies, e.g.,
stock outs, and others to reluctance to stock and supply
NHI clients with items that are seen as potentially caus-
ing financial loss to the provider because of unattractive
NHI tariffs.Time spent with patients
It was not clear that time spent in the clinics by clients
was related to provider payment incentives. Client loads
and staffing constraints rather appeared to be the influ-
ences over it. Figure 8 summarizes total time spent by
facility. The longest waiting times were in the crowded
mission (CHAG) and public (Ghana Health Service) hos-
pitals, polyclinics and health centres. The private hospitals
and clinics and the CHPS compounds were we recorded
the lowest times spent by patients in getting care were also
the facilities in which we observed lower client numbers.Pulling it all together
We have qualitatively explored some answers to questions
related to the “what” and the “why” of service supply
behaviour and incentives related to provider payment
methods of the Ghana NHIS. To answer the “what” ques-
tion, we have conceptualized and described service supply
behaviour in two dimensions of numbers of insured cli-
ents and inputs into management of individual clients
seen. To answer the “why” question, we have drawn upon
systems thinking and realist evaluation theories and exam-
ined the wider national context, the health system, and
their influence. We now pull these pieces together to gen-
erate potential explanatory theory employing the systems
thinking tool of causal loop and causes tree diagrams
qualitatively. Figure 9, a causal loop diagram, is our con-
cluding theoretical model. Since the diagram is qualita-
tively constructed, it provides no indication of magnitude
of effect.
Figure 8 Total time spent by facility.
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of influence of one factor on the other is show by the
direction of the arrow. The labels at the tips of the arrows
indicate whether the influence is to cause a decrease or in-
crease in the level of the influenced factor. An “S” sign
against the arrow head means that, as the causal variable
increases or decreases, the influenced variable changes in
the same direction. An “O” sign means the change is in
the opposite direction. Where there is neither an “O” or
an “S” sign, the relationship is something other than a
straight forward increase or decrease.
Thus, for example in Figure 9, we theorize that the
amount of internally generated funds (IGF) available for
immediate use through NHI payments influences incen-
tives to supply service to insured clients. IGF is a term
used in Ghana to describe funds that are generated and
retained for use at the facility level as compared to ‘ex-
ternal’ funds such as Central Government allocations.
IGF comes from NHI payments, out of pocket fees, and,
in a few instances, reimbursements from corporations
and agencies on behalf of their workers. For privatesector facilities it is their entire source of income. For
public sector facilities it forms 80% or more of their in-
come for recurrent expenditure [33]. The more IGF is,
the more incentivized providers are to supply services to
insured clients in both dimensions. Out of pocket pay-
ments have an immediate effect on IGF availability un-
like NHIS payments whose effects are modified by the
time lag between claims submission and claims payment.
Additionally, IGF availability from insured clients is af-
fected by the perceived and actual complexity of claims
processing procedures of provider and purchaser. Com-
plex procedures tend to take more time to fulfil and can
increase the time lag to final payment. They also require
more skilled staff numbers and time and may be more
likely to lead to mistakes in claims submission by pro-
viders as well as auditing by the purchaser that lead to
denial of claims.
Causal loop diagrams are difficult to follow for those
who have not been involved in the details of construct-
ing them. To make the causal loop diagram easier to fol-
low, we have unpacked its core into a series of cause
Figure 9 Causal loop diagram.
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that we theorize from our observations to have a direct in-
fluence on supply incentives. These are IGF available for
immediate use, level of general budget support provided
by government for service delivery, personal provider in-
come per client encounter, and workload. Factors that dir-
ectly influence each of these factors are unpacked in cause
tree diagrams 10B–E.
There does not appear to be a linear relationship be-
tween provider payment method and incentives to see
more active NHIS card holders or provide more inputs
per client. The relationships are indirect and modified
by contextual factors. Some of the different factors are
controlled by different agents or actors, with some con-
trolled by multiple agents. A reinforcing loop in the causal
loop diagram is the link between institutional functioning
and IGF available for immediate use. We theorized that
better-managed facilities might be better able to find ways
of coping with the resource constraints of the health sys-
tem. Improved resource availability was likely to reinforce
better management.
The observed status of many of the variables would
produce a tendency to prefer out of pocket paying cli-
ents to clients who are paid for by insurance and to con-
tract some but not all service inputs to insured clients.
Our data does not allow us to answer the question of
whether the current levels of inputs per client are ad-
equate. More services do not necessarily translate into
high quality and responsiveness. However, it is doubtful
if a tendency to incentivise contraction of service inputsin a system of resource scarcity will ensure high quality
and responsiveness.
Conclusions
In our study setting, service supply behaviour and the
incentives driving it cannot necessarily be predicted in
abstract from the theory about the anticipated response
to a given payment method. The wider national context
as well as characteristics of the health system into which
the method is introduced shape and modify supply be-
haviour and incentives. This is not surprising given that
the payment method reforms have been introduced into a
complex adaptive system. The individual agents (whether
institutions, persons or groups) in such systems are inter-
connected and have the freedom to act in ways that are
not always predictable. Whether ignored or acknowl-
edged, complexity remains and affects outcomes in such
systems. To be able to cope, it is better to recognize,
understand and try to work with complexity rather than
engage in the futile effort of trying to “reduce” it with
linear approaches [34,35].
Provider payment reform in low- and middle-income
countries should pay at least as much, if not a little
more, attention to context of the reform and the poten-
tial interactions between the reform and context and
the resulting intended and unintended effects as to the
method itself in the design and implementation of
reform.
Finally, Gauri [36] has observed that “data limitations,






Figure 10 (A) Factors influencing service supply incentives. (B) Factors influencing IGF available for immediate use. (C) Factors influencing
personal income per client encounter. (D) Factors influencing workload. (E) Factors influencing level of direct government budget support
to providers.
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ical research on provider payment mechanism effects
on providers in low- and middle-income countries. We
agree from our experience and make a plea for con-
tinued work on methodological approaches in such
settings.Endnote
aPrescriptions transcribed with missing data dropped
from the analysis accounts for the difference between
the total number of prescriptions in the sample (528)
and the number of prescriptions from which analysis is
presented (527).
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